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Abstract
A distinctive property of human and animal intelligence is the ability to form ab-
stractions by neglecting irrelevant information which allows to separate structure
from noise. From an information theoretic point of view abstractions are desirable
because they allow for very efficient information processing. In artificial systems
abstractions are often implemented through computationally costly formations of
groups or clusters. In this work we establish the relation between the free-energy
framework for decision making and rate-distortion theory and demonstrate how
the application of rate-distortion for decision-making leads to the emergence of
abstractions. We argue that abstractions are induced due to a limit in information
processing capacity.
1 Introduction
Most scientific papers start with an abstract that focuses on the main ideas of the work but leaves out
many of the details. From an information theoretic point of view this allows for very efficient pro-
cessing which is crucial if information processing capabilities are limited. In general, abstractions
are formed by reducing the information content of an entity until it contains only information that
is relevant for a particular purpose. This partial neglect of information can lead to different entities
being treated as equal or, phrased differently, the separation of structure from noise. Consider the
abstract concept of a “chair”, where many aspects such as the size, color, material or particular shape
are considered as noise that is irrelevant to the purpose of “sitting down”.
The ability to form abstractions is thought of as a hallmark of intelligence, both in cognitive tasks
and in basic sensorimotor behaviors [1–6] Traditionally it is conceptualized as being computation-
ally costly because particular entities have to be grouped together by neglecting irrelevant infor-
mation. Here we argue that abstractions arise as a consequence of limited computational capacity.
The inability to distinguish different entities leads to the formation of abstractions. Note that this
information processing limitation can be induced through limited computational capacity, but also
through limited sample sizes or low signal-to-noise ratios. In this paper we study abstractions in
the process of decision-making, where “similar” situations elicit the same behavior when partially
ignoring the current situational context.
Following the work of [7] decision-making with limited information-processing resources has been
studied extensively in psychology, economics, political science, industrial organization, computer
science and artificial intelligence research. In this paper we use a information-theoretic model of
decision-making under resource constraints [8–14]. In particular, [15–18] present a framework in
which gain in expected utility is traded off against the adaptation cost of changing from an initial
behavior to a posterior behavior. The variational problem that arises due to this trade-off has the same
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mathematical form as the minimization of a free energy difference functional in thermodynamics.
Here, we discuss the close connection between the thermodynamic decision-making framework
[15] and rate-distortion theory which is an information theoretic framework for lossy compression.
The problem in lossy compression is essentially the problem of separating structure from noise
and is thus highly related to finding abstractions [19–21]. In the context of decision-making the
rate-distortion framework can be applied by conceptualizing the decision-maker as a channel from
observations to actions with limited capacity, which is known in economics as the framework of
“Rational Inattention” [22].
In the next section we discuss how the rate-distortion framework can be obtained for bounded-
rational decision-makers that face a number of tasks. In Section 3 we demonstrate two simple
applications to explore the type of abstractions that emerge from limited information processing
capabilities. In Section 4 we summarize the findings and discuss the presented approach.
2 Rate-distortion theory for decision-making
2.1 Bounded-rational decision-making
In [15], a bounded-rational actor that initially follows a policy p0(x) changes its behavior to q(x)
in a way that optimally trades off the expected gain in utility against the transformation costs for
adapting from p0(x) to q(x). This trade-off is formalized by the following variational principle
argmax
q(x)
∆F [q] = argmax
q(x)
∑
x
q(x)U(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Eq(x)[U ]
− 1
β
∑
x
q(x) log
q(x)
p0(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
DKL(q||p0)
, (1)
where β is known as the inverse temperature and ∆F is known as the difference in free energy—
negative free energy in physics—which is composed of the expected utility w.r.t. q(x) and the
Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence between q(x) and p0(x). β acts as a conversion-factor between
transformation cost (usually in nats or bits) and the expected utility.
The distribution q(x) that maximizes the variational principle is given by
q(x) =
1
Z
p0(x)e
βU(x), (2)
with the partition sum Z =
∑
ξ p0(ξ)e
βU(ξ).
The influence of the transformation cost and thus the boundedness of the actor is governed by the
parameter β which determines “how far” the final behavior q(x) can deviate from the initial behavior
p0(x) measured in terms of KL-divergence. The perfectly rational actor that maximizes his utility
can be recovered as the limit case β → ∞ where transformation cost is ignored, whereas β → 0
corresponds to an actor that has infinite transformation cost or no computational resources and, thus,
sticks with his prior policy p0.
Note that in the notation shown here, U(x) is conceptualized as a function over gains. In case U(x)
corresponds to a loss-function, the same variational principle allows to find the distribution q(x)
that optimally trades off minimum expected loss against transformation cost. In this case the argmin
over q(x) has to be taken and the sign of β is inverted. In case x is a continuous random variable,
sums have to be replaced by the corresponding integrals.
2.2 Multi-task decision-making with limited resources
Consider an actor that is embedded into an environment and receives (potentially partial and noisy)
information about the current state of the environment, that is the actor observes the value of a
random variable y. This observation y allows the actor to reduce uncertainty about the current
state of the environment and adapt its behavior correspondingly. Formally this is expressed with
the conditional distribution p(x|y) over the action x. The thermodynamic framework for decision-
making introduced in the previous section can straightforwardly be harnessed for describing such a
bounded-rational agent that receives information y by plugging in the conditional distribution p(x|y)
2
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into Equation 1
argmax
p(x|y)
Ep(x|y)[Uy(x)]− 1
β
DKL(p(x|y)||p0(x)), (3)
with the solution
p(x|y) = 1
Z
p0(x)e
βUy(x). (4)
Notice that the utility function U in general depends on the observation y, leading to U(x, y), but to
indicate the conditioning on a specific value of y we write Uy(x).
The initial distribution p0(x) can be interpreted as a default- or prior-behavior in the absence of an
observation, thus we will refer to p0(x) as “the prior”. The information processing cost is then given
as the KL divergence between p(x|y) and the prior p(x) with the conversion factor β that relates the
units of transformation cost and the units of utility.
2.3 The optimal prior
In the free energy principle (Equation 3), the prior p0(x) is assumed to be given. A very interesting
question is which prior distribution p0(x) maximizes the free energy difference ∆F for all observa-
tions y on average. To formalize this question, we extend the variational principle in Equation 3 by
taking the expectation over y and the argmax over p0(x)
argmax
p0(x)
∑
y
p(y)
[
argmax
p(x|y)
Ep(x|y)[Uy(x)]− 1
β
DKL(p(x|y)||p0(x))
]
.
The inner argmax-operator over p(x|y) and the expectation over y can be swapped because the
variation is not over p(y). With the KL-term expanded this leads to
argmax
p0(x),p(x|y)
∑
x,y
p(x, y)U(x, y)− 1
β
∑
y
p(y)
∑
x
p(x|y) log p(x|y)
p0(x)
.
The solution to the argmax over p0(x) is given by p0(x) =
∑
y p(y)p(x|y) = p(x). (see 2.1.1 in [19]
or [23]). Plugging in p(x) for p0(x) yields the following variational principle for bounded-rational
decision-making with a minimum average relative entropy prior
argmax
p(x|y)
∑
x,y
p(x, y)U(x, y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ep(x,y)[U ]
− 1
β
∑
y
p(y)DKL(p(x|y)||p(x))︸ ︷︷ ︸
I(x;y)
, (5)
where I(x; y) is the mutual information between x and y. The variational problem can be interpreted
as maximizing expected utility with an upper bound on the mutual information or in the dual point
of view, as minimizing the mutual information between actions and observations with a lower bound
on the expected utility. The problem in Equation 5 is equivalent to the problem formulation in rate-
distortion theory ( [19, 24, 25]), where U(x, y) is usually conceptualized as a distortion function
d(x, y) which leads to a flip in the sign of β and an argmin instead of an argmax.
The solution that extremizes the variational problem is given by the self-consistent equations (see
[19])
p(x|y) = 1
Z
p(x)eβUy(x), (6)
p(x) =
∑
y
p(y)p(x|y). (7)
Note that the solution for the conditional distribution p(x|y) in the rate-distortion problem (Equa-
tion 6) is the same as the solution in the free energy case of the previous section (Equation 4), except
that the prior p0(x) is now defined as the marginal distribution p0(x) = p(x) (see Equation 7). This
3
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particular prior distribution minimizes the the average relative entropy between p(x|y) and p(x)
which is the mutual information between actions x and observations y.
In the limit-case β →∞ where transformation costs are ignored, p(x|y) is equal to the perfectly ra-
tional policy for each value of y independent of any of the other policies and p(x) becomes a mixture
of these solutions. Note that if there is a subset of perfectly rational solutions that is shared among
tasks, then only this subset will be assigned probability mass since it reduces mutual information
(see Section 3.3) Importantly, high values of the mutual information term in Equation 5 will not lead
to a penalization, which means that actions x can be very informative about the observation y. The
behavior of an actor with infinite computational resources will thus be very observation-specific.
In the case β → 0 the mutual information between actions and observations is minimized to
I(x; y) = 0, leading to p(x|y) = p(x) ∀y, the maximal abstraction where all y elicit the same
response. The actor’s behavior p(x|y) becomes independent of the observation y due to the lack in
computational resources to change its behavior. Within this limitation the actor will, however, still
emit actions that maximize the expected utility
∑
x,y p(x)U(x, y).
For values of the rationality parameter β in between these limit-cases, that is 0 < β < ∞, the
bounded-rational actor trades off observation-specific actions that lead to a higher expected utility
for particular observations at the cost of high mutual information between observations y and actions
x, against abstract actions that yield a “good” expected utility for many observations and lead to a
lower mutual information term.
An alternative interpretation, closer to the rate-distortion framework, is that the perceptual channel
through which y is transmitted to the actor has a limited capacity given by C = I(x; y). For large
values of β, the transmission of y is not severely influenced and the actor can choose the best action
for this particular observation. For lower values of β however, the actor becomes very uncertain
about the true value of y and has to choose abstract actions that are “good” under all observations
which are compatible with the actor’s belief over y.
2.4 Computing the self-consistent solution
The self-consistent solutions that maximize the variational principle in Equation 5 can be computed
by starting with an initial distribution p0(x) and then iterating Equation 6 and Equation 7 in an
alternating fashion. This procedure is well known in the rate-distortion framework as a Blahut-
Arimoto-type algorithm [25,26]. The iteration is guaranteed to converge to a unique maximum (see
2.1.1 in [19] and [23, 24]. Note that p0(x) has to have the same support as p(x).
Implemented in a straightforward manner, the Blahut-Arimoto iterations can become computation-
ally costly since the iterations involve evaluating the utility function for every action-observation-
pair (x, y) and computing the normalization constant Z. In case of continuous-valued random vari-
ables, closed-form analytic solutions exist only for special cases.
3 Abstractions in multi-task decision-making
3.1 Problem formulation
In the following we present the application of the rate-distortion framework for decision-making
introduced in the previous section to multi-task decision problems. We assume that we are given a
number of tasks within the same environment and that the observations from the environment are
fully informative about the current task, that is we observe the value of a discrete random variable y
corresponding to a unique task. Note that this assumption can easily be relaxed.
More formally we make the following assumptions: we are given a set ofN tasks τ = {t1, t2, ...tN}
which define the set of observations y ∈ {y1, y2, ..., yN} with yi = yj if and only if i = j. Each
task is defined through the utility function U(x, y), where x is an action. The action-space x ∈ X is
the same for all tasks. We assume that the probability over tasks is known and given by p(y).
The goal of the decision maker is to find task-specific distributions p(x|y) that maximize the ex-
pected utility
∑
x,y p(x|y)U(x, y) given its computational constraints. This problem is formalized
in the variational principle in Equation 5 with the self-consistent solutions in Equations 6, 7. In this
4
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β = 100 β = 1
x U(x, y1) U(x, y2) p(x) p(x|y1) p(x|y2) p(x) p(x|y1) p(x|y2)
[0, 0] 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
[0, 1] 0 1 0.5 0 1 0 0 0
[0.7, 0] 0.7 0.7 0 0 0 1 1 1
[1, 1] 1 0 0.5 1 0 0 0 0
Table 1: Two-task decision problem. Possible actions and their utilities for both tasks are given in
the first three columns of the table. The results of the Blahut-Arimoto iterations for a large value of
β are shown in the middle three columns. In this case the maximum-utility action for each task is
picked with full certainty. The results for a small value of β are shown in the last three columns.
The decision maker does not have computational resources to change its behavior according to the
task and thus always picks the suboptimal action that leads to a high utility in both tasks.
principle for bounded-rational decision-making, information processing costs arise from changing
the prior-behavior p(x) to the task-specific behavior p(x|y) and are measured in terms of KL-cost
in accordance with the thermodynamic framework for decision-making [15].
3.2 Trading off abstraction against optimal action
We designed the following two-task problem, to demonstrate the role of the rationality parameter
β that governs the trade-off between expected utility and mutual information. In both tasks, the
action x = [x1, x2] is one of four possible action-vectors (see Table 1). The utility for the first task
is simply given by the value of the first component of the action vector, whereas the utility for the
second task is the Manhattan distance between the two components of the action vector:
U(x, y) =
{
x1 if y = y1
|x1 − x2| if y = y2 .
The utilities for all actions are summarized in Table 1. The observation-variable y ∈ y1, y2 is fully
informative about the task with the task probabilities p(y1) = p(y2) = 12 .
With this particular choice of utility functions and action-vectors, the maximum-utility action for one
task has a utility of zero for the other task. However, there is a suboptimal action x∗sub = [0.7, 0] that
leads to the second-best utility in both environments. The simulation results summarized in Table 1
show that for a high value of the inverse temperature β the decision-maker picks the maximum-
utility action in each task with probability 1. At a low value of β the actor uses the same action
distribution for both tasks due to its boundedness, resulting in I(x; y) = 0. This leads to a maximal
abstraction over both tasks which is solved optimally by putting all the probability mass on the
suboptimal action x∗sub. Note that the limit β = 1 shown here is in general still far from the fully
bounded limit β → 0 — in this particular example however lowering β further has no effect.
Figure 1 A shows the transition from perfect rationality to full boundedness. Starting at β ≈ ∞
the entropy of the conditionals H(x|y) is zero, since for a given task the actor picks the maximum-
utility action with certainty. By lowering the inverse temperature β, both the mutual information
I(x; y) and the expected utility Ep(x,y)[U ] monotonically decrease. Initially H(x) stays constant,
whereas H(x|y) increases, which means that the actor picks the two maximum-utility actions with
increasing stochasticity. At 1β ≈ 0.55 a phase transition occurs — the entropy H(x) rapidly peaks
at 1.585bits implying that three actions are now equally probable in p(x). Lowering β further leads
to a rapid drop in H(x), H(x|y) and I(x; y) to zero bits as well as a drop in expected utility to 0.7.
The decision maker is now in the fully abstract regime, where x∗sub is always chosen, regardless of
the task.
Figure 1 B shows the Rate-Utility function (in analogy to the rate-distortion function) where the in-
formation processing rate I(x; y) is shown as a function of the expected utility. If the decision-maker
is conceptualized as a communication channel between observations and actions, the rate I(x; y)
defines the minimal required capacity of that channel. The Rate-Utility function thus specifies the
minimum required capacity for computing an action with a certain expected utility, or analogously
the maximally achievable expected utility given a certain information processing capacity. Impor-
5
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tantly, decision-makers in the shaded region are impossible, whereas decision-makers in the white
region are suboptimal with respect to their information processing capabilities.
Figure 1: Transition from full rationality (β ≈ ∞) to full boundedness (β ≈ 0). A Trade-off
between I(x; y) = H(x)−H(x|y) and expected utilityEp(x,y)[U ] B Rate-Utility function showing
the information processing rate I(x; y) as a function of the expected utility. The rate specifies the
minimal average number of bits of the observation y that need to be processed in order to achieve
a certain expected utility. For the limit β → ∞ the decision maker picks the maximum utility
action for each environment deterministically thus following the maximum expected utility (MEU)
principle.
3.3 Changing the level of granularity
Abstractions are formed by reducing the information content of an entity until it only contains rel-
evant information. For a discrete random variable x ∈ X this translates into forming a partitioning
over the space X where “similar” elements are grouped into the same subset of X and become in-
distinguishable within the subset. In physics changing the granularity of a partitioning to a coarser
level is known as coarse-graining which reduces the resolution of the space X in a nonuniform
manner. In the rate-distortion framework the partitioning emerges in the shared prior p(x) as a soft-
partitioning (see [20]), where actions x with the same average utility get the same probability mass
and become essentially indistinguishable.
To demonstrate this, we use a binary grid of size NxN , N = 3 where each cell of the grid can
be white xi = 0 or colored in black xi = 1. Actions are particular patterns on this grid thus
the actionspace becomes x ∈ {binary sequences of length N2}. The utility function defines the
following three tasks:
1. The utility equals the number of colored pixels, but one row and one column has to be
all-white, otherwise the utility is zero.
2. Any pattern with exactly four colored pixels scores a utility of +4, all other patterns have
utility zero.
3. Any pattern with an even number of colored pixels scores a utility equal to the total number
of colored pixels; all other patterns have a utility of zero.
Figure 2 shows 16 samples each from the conditionals p(x|y) for each task and the prior p(x) for
β = 10. Since the inverse temperature is high, all the samples with nonzero probability are actions
that yield maximum utility in their particular task. Note that the patterns that lead to a maximum
utility in task (1) are a subset of the patterns that lead to maximum utility in task (2) but also lead
to a nonzero utility in task (3). Since transformation costs are mostly ignored in this case, the
patterns appearing for task (3) are very different from the patterns in task (1). Note however that
the additional patterns in task (2) that would also lead to maximum utility are assigned a probability
of zero. The subset of patterns which are also optimal in task (1) is sufficient to achieve maximum
6
NIPS 2013 workshop on Planning with Information Constraints
expected utility and by not including the additional “specialized” patterns for task (2) the mutual
information can be reduced significantly. The prior p(x) consists essentially of two kinds of patterns:
the ones that are optimal in task (1) and (2) simultaneously and the patterns that are optimal in task
(3). The first two tasks have essentially become indistinguishable because the actor will respond
with exactly the same action-distribution.
By lowering the inverse temperature to β = 0.1 (see Figure 3), the mutual information constraint
gets more weight and suboptimal patterns are picked for task (3), similar to the simulation in the
previous section. The behavior of the actor has now become indistinguishable for all three tasks at
the expense of a lower expected utility. Importantly, the effective resolution of the prior p(x) has
reduced from two distinct sets of patterns to a single set of indistinguishable patterns (in terms of
their expected utility). The level of granularity of the prior has been reduced even further.
Figure 2: Sampled patterns for β = 10. The number above each pattern indicates the probability
of the pattern in the corresponding distribution. A Samples for task (1) P (x|y = 1). All shown
patterns yield maximum utility in the task. B Samples for task (2) P (x|y = 2). All shown pat-
terns yield maximum utility in this task, however task (2) has more patterns that would potentially
lead to maximum utility—only the subset that coincides with the maximum utility patterns in (1)
has nonzero probability though. This is a consequence of sharing the same prior p(x) and mutual
information minimization. C Samples for task (3) P (x|y = 3). The patterns in task (1) and (2)
would also have a nonzero probability in task (3), but the sampled patterns shown here yield twice
the utility and have thus all the probability mass. D Samples from the shared prior P (x). The prior
is a mixture over the patterns shown in the conditional distributions.
Figure 3: Sampled patterns for β = 0.1. The number above each pattern indicates the probability
of the pattern in the corresponding distribution. A Samples for task (1) P (x|y = 1). B Samples for
task (2) P (x|y = 2). C Samples for task (3) P (x|y = 3). Compared to the case β = 10 in Figure 2,
the increased weight of the mutual information term I(x; y) has led to the selection of suboptimal
actions in task (3), similar to the previous simulation. D Samples from the shared prior P (x). In
the fully abstract regime all conditional distributions are exactly equal to the prior p(x), leading to
I(x; y) = 0.
4 Discussion & Conclusions
In this work, we discussed the connection between the thermodynamic framework [15] for decision-
making with information processing costs and rate-distortion theory. This connection implies
7
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a novel interpretation of the rate-distortion framework for multi-task bounded-rational decision-
making. Importantly, abstractions emerge naturally in this framework due to limited information
processing capabilities. The authors in [27] find a very similar emergence of “natural abstractions”
and “ritualized behavior” when studying goal-directed behavior in the MPD case using the Relevant
Information method, which is a particular application of rate-distortion theory.
Although not shown here, the approach presented in this paper straightforwardly carries over to
an inference case by treating y as observations and x as the belief-state. In the inference case,
limited information processing capacities make it impossible to detect certain patterns which in turn
renders different entities indistinguishable, leading to the formation of abstractions. This idea has
been explored previously in [20, 21]. Both, the work just mentioned and our work are inspired by
the Information Bottleneck Method [19], which is mathematically very similar to the rate-distortion
problem (with a particular choice of distortion function) and thus also to the approach presented
here.
Note that limited information processing capabilities can arise for various reasons. The most obvious
reason, perhaps, is the lack of computational power which is in many cases equivalent to certain
time-constraints (such as reaction times) or memory constraints. Other reasons for information
processing limits are small sample sizes or low signal-to-noise ratios that put an upper limit on the
mutual information independent of available computational power.
In the approach presented here, we assume that the decision-maker draws samples from p(x). Re-
sponding to a certain task with a sample from p(x|y) could then be implemented for instance with
a rejection sampling procedure. The prior p(x) will then be the proposal-distribution that has the
highest average acceptance rate over all tasks y. The computational cost of finding p(x) is not part
of the current framework. These implications have to be explored in further work.
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